I. Introduction
Three characteristics distinguish the U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry. First, the industry is highly concentrated. Although there are approximately 40 companies producing more than 400 brands, more than 90% of output since 1980 has been produced by just five companies 1 . Another characteristic is extensive advertising. Average selling expenses are 30% of sales value, with smaller firms tending to advertise more than large firms. Moreover, most of this expense is for mass-media advertising. The third distinguishing characteristic of the RTE cereal industry is product proliferation. New product launches have increased from one or two products per year in 1950, to more than 100 per year since 1989. If one accounts for all of the variations in sizes and flavors of the 400 brands, there are approximately 1000 RTE cereal products for sale in the U.S. Private label products, an important source of competition in other industries, have limited effect in the RTE cereal industry. Though they are priced about 40% above private label products, branded products continuously capture more than 90% of the market (Connor, 1999) .
These attributes tend to facilitate the exercise of either unilateral or cooperative market power, and in the past have led U.S. antitrust authorities to closely scrutinize the RTE cereal industry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in fact, devoted up to two-thirds of its resources to investigate the industry during the Ford and Carter administrations. The FTC sued the top three manufacturersKelloggs, General Mills, and Post -for effectively operating as a "shared monopoly". However, the prosecution was ended abruptly by Congressional action in 1981 (Warner, 1981) .
The objective of this study is to examine both the degree and type of market power that may have been exercised by top cereal companies in the years before termination of the "Big Three" case (1975 Three" case ( -1980 , and then in the years after termination of the case (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . Our hypothesis is that once the industry no longer found itself under the spotlight of an on-going governmental investigation, conduct became substantially less competitive. Additionally, we hypothesize that the increase in overall market power was driven mainly by a rise in coordinated as opposed to unilateral market power.
To test these hypotheses, we quantify the conduct of U.S. cereal makers using the differentiatedproducts oligopoly framework of Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996) . Their approach provides us with a convenient way to parameterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes, ranging from perfect collusion to perfect rivalry. The Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (CFM) approach nests as special cases residual demand models that do not enable separation of unilateral from coordinated market power (e.g. Baker and Bresnahan, 1985) , as well as unilateral demand approaches allowing for only Nash-Bertrand behavior (e.g. Hausman, Leonard, Zona, 1994; Nevo, 2001) . As in CFM's analysis, we employ the Rothschild, Chamberlin, and Cotterill indexes to quantify the exercise of different forms of market power.
Data are from Selling Area Markets Inc. (SAMI), which reported the four-week U.S. average price and quantity of approximately 70 cereals sold in supermarkets between 1975 and 1990 . In this stage of the paper's development, we work with 12 brands of the "traditional kid" segment. This sample accounts for 80% of that segment and represents four cereal companies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we lay out our conceptual model for addressing the issue of market conduct. In section III the empirical procedures and data used to implement the conceptual model are described. The results are described in section IV, and section V gives our conclusions.
II. Conceptual framework
Models of differentiated products using brand level data have been developed by Bresnahan (1985 and 1988) , Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) , and Cotterill and Haller (1997) . The
Baker and Bresnahan approach involves the estimation of residual demands, which can indicate whether the demand facing a group of firms is sufficiently inelastic (after accounting for rival behavior) to enable the exercise of market power. In contrast to the residual demand approach, Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, and Cotterill and Haller assume Nash-Bertrand conjectures (implying 0
) and estimate unilateral demand systems. For the purposes of this study, each of these frameworks have a key limitation. Specifically, the residual demand approach does not enable separation of unilateral from coordinated market power, and the unilateral demand approach allows for only one type of behavior (Nash-Bertrand).
In a 1996 paper, Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (CFM) developed a framework that does not have these limitations. Their approach allows price reaction elasticities (also known as conjectural variations parameters) to be non-zero and vary across brands, and enables the identification of unilateral market power separately from that of coordinated market power. It allows for both perfect collusion and perfect competition, and nests the Hausman, Leonard, Zona and Baker and Bresnahan models as special cases.
CFM use three indexes of market power to decompose the degree of market power arising from collusion versus that which arises from unilateral market power. A less-satisfying feature of the CFM approach is that the observed and estimated price reaction elasticities are not consistent in general 2 , and a static framework is used to characterize strategic interaction among firms. Despite these theoretical shortcomings, CFM's framework has been shown to be empirically tractable, and provides us with a convenient way to parameterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes. As such it greatly facilitates empirical analysis of pricing and profitability at the brand level.
For these reasons, we follow CFM's general framework to examine the issue of market power in the RTE cereal industry, although we make two minor modifications. First of all, we derive the expression for optimal markup and the price elasticity of demand from a brand manager's profitmaximization problem, instead of a brand's demand function. Additionally, we follow a different route to derive fully collusive elasticities. These departures will be explained in more detail below.
Brand manager's problem
The cereal industry is characterized by a small number of firms selling multiple brands. As such, it may be more realistic to consider the profit-max problem of a multi-brand firm (as in Nevo 2001 ) than that of a brand manager who maximizes profits independently of other brand managers in the same firm.
However, in terms of the optimal markup (i.e. price-cost margin), the only practical difference between these approaches is that the multi-brand approach automatically assumes that brands of the same firm have price reaction elasticities ( ij ε ) identically equal to 1 (that is, pricing behavior is "fully collusive" across brands within a firm). With the brand-manager approach, price reaction elasticities are determined empirically, using observations of actual market behavior, and so may differ from 1. Viewing this greater generality as an advantage, we analyze the profit-max problem from the perspective of an independent brand manager.
We begin by assuming that the profit function for a individual brand of cereal -in this case brand 1 -can be represented as: w is the expenditure share on brand 1,
is the elasticity of demand for brand i with respect to the price of brand j,
is a price reaction elasticity (i.e. the degree that brand i tends to respond to a change in brand j's price). Solving for the optimal markup (i.e. price-cost margin) yields 3 :
The remainder of the analysis focuses on the denominator of the right-hand side of (3), whichfollowing CFM -we call the observable own price elasticity of demand ( 
Market conduct indexes
While the elasticities described above can characterize the competitive structure of the RTE cereal industry, it is helpful to further use a set of standardized indexes to analyze market conduct.
Following CFM, we employ the Rothschild Index, Cotterill Index, and Chamberlin Quotient to decompose total market power into its unilateral and collusive components.
The Rothschild Index (RI) indicates how close the brand comes to reaching its maximum market power (as given by the fully collusive demand elasticity, C 1 η ) when it acts unilaterally. The RI is defined as the slope of the unilateral demand divided by the slope of the fully collusive demand. In the neighborhood of the price p 1 (see Figure 1 ), this is equivalent to dividing the fully collusive price elasticity by the unilateral price elasticity:
. When RI equals zero there is perfect competition; when it equals one there is full collusion.
Assuming again that C 1 η is the maximum market power that could be exerted by a brand, the Cotterill Index (CI) indicates the extent to which that theoretical maximum is achieved by the brand.
The CI is obtained by dividing the fully collusive price elasticity by the observed price elasticity at a given price and quantity observation:
. When the CI equals zero there is perfect competition or unilateral market power offset by rivalry; when the CI equals one there is monopolistic behavior.
A third index used by CFM is the Chamberlin Quotient (CQ), which is the proportion of the observed market power that is not assigned to unilateral power:
. If there is no coordination or rivalry across brands, the CQ is zero (Nash-Bertrand conjectures) and the observed price elasticity is identical to the unilateral price elasticity. With increasing degrees of collusion the CQ approaches one. In the case of competitive rivalry, the CQ becomes negative, with a lower bound of (−∞).
III. Empirical framework and data
The empirical procedure consists of estimating unilateral ( 11
η ) elasticities, then using them to calculate the Rothschild Index, Cotterill Index, and
Chamberlin Quotient for each brand. This requires a set of own and cross-price elasticities of consumer demand ( ij η ), as well as price reaction elasticities ( ij ε ). In turn, the former requires estimation of a set of demand equations, while the latter involves the estimation of price response equations. We describe these steps below.
Demand elasticity estimation framework
Estimating brand-level elasticities is particularly challenging for an industry in which there are hundreds of brands 5 . One method for limiting the number of parameters to be estimated while analyzing multiple brands is to employ a multinomial logit model. Although this approach is appealing for its tractability, substitution between products is driven completely by market shares instead of how similar the products are. This poses a particular problem for brand-level analysis in a market with multiple segments. For example, suppose there are two kid cereals, Kid1 and Kid2, and a third, mature adultoriented cereal, Health. If Kid2 and Health have the same share of the overall market, then a logit model will restrict the cross-price elasticity of demand with respect to Kid1 to be the same for Kid2 and Health.
In other words, if the price of kid cereal Kid1 goes up, consumers are assumed to switch towards Health by the same amount that they do for Kid2. Since we would not expect Health to be as good a substitute for Kid1 as would Kid2, this feature of the logit model has traditionally made it less appealing for analyzing market power in differentiated-product industry 6 .
Recent improvements to the logit model appear to have minimized this shortcoming, however.
For example, Nevo (2001) developed a generalized version of the logit framework, and used it to estimate brand level elasticities for the RTE cereal market 7 . The use of a random-coefficients model allows him to avoid the cross-price elasticity problem described above, without having to make assumptions about the 5 The precise number of brands depends on how a brand is defined, as well as the year in question. 6 CFM, in fact, characterize this feature as a "major flaw" (p. 9). 7 See the exchange between Timothy Bresnahan and Jerry Hausman regarding Aviv Nevo's econometric work on the cereal industry at the bottom of this web page: http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/research.htm way in which the cereal industry is segmented. Nevo's model is still highly restricted (since each brand of cereal has the same coefficient on price in the indirect utility function) but he provides very plausible elasticity estimates for 25 different cereals. In particular, all cross-price elasticities are positive (as one would intuitively expect), and those corresponding to cereals of the same segment tend to be larger than those corresponding to separate segments. While these results suggest that recent developments in logit models are promising, they have yet to be used in price reaction analysis without the Nash-Bertrand assumption.
Another approach for reducing the number of parameters that must be estimated is to use a multilevel demand model. Originally this method was developed to deal with demand for broad categories like food, clothing, and housing. More recently it has been adapted for the analysis of demand for differentiated products (Hausman, Leonard and Zona; CFM) . The multilevel demand assumption would seem to be consistent with the RTE cereal industry, since research indicates that cereals are "spatially" differentiated products that can be grouped into different segments (Schmalensee 1978 Given the segmentation of the RTE cereal industry, we use the multilevel demand model and focus on one segment at a time, which greatly facilitates estimation work. For the present paper we focus exclusively on the "Traditional Kid" segment identified in Cotterill and Haller, because it appears to be one of the better defined segments, in terms of the substitutability of brands within it. (For more on the 12 brands we included within the Traditional Kid segment, see the "Data" section below.) We assume that brand managers recognize both the segmentation of the cereal market and the multi-stage decision process of consumers.
We estimate demand elasticities using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . AIDS is widely used for demand system analysis because it is flexible, is compatible with aggregation over consumers, and is easy to estimate and interpret. The AIDS model in budget share form is:
where w i is the expenditure share on the ith brand, p j is the price of the jth brand, x is total expenditure on kids' cereals, and log P is a general price index. In the case of the Linear Approximate AIDS model, which is estimated in this paper, log P is approximated by what Deaton and Muellbaeur refer to as 'Stone's price index'. Mathematically this index is:
. The theoretical properties of adding-up, zero-degree homogeneity of demand functions, and symmetry of cross price effects imply the following parametric restrictions:
Because the data employed in this study is purely time series (which may cause problems with serial correlation), we follow Deaton and Muellbauer's suggestion to use the first differences of the variables. Differentiating the budget share form of the AIDS model and making use of the fact that Barten, 1993, p. 134-135) 
For estimation purposes the above equation needs to be transformed into finite differences, and needs an error term it u . The final empirical form of the demand model is then:
, ∀ brands i,j and periods t .
In this equation we define 
Price reaction estimation framework
Price reaction equations are deduced by substituting the AIDS demand functions into the brand manager's profit function (1) and (as before) assuming Bertrand price competition. Because the details of CFM's derivation are lengthy and involved, we refer the reader to their paper instead of repeating the derivations here. The end result is a system of price reaction functions that are logarithmic in prices:
Although these i simultaneous equations appear simple, note that the parameters i θ and ij ε represent complex functions of the model's structural parameters, due to the incorporation of AIDS functions into the profit-maximization framework.
Estimating the price reaction model involves a number of challenges. First of all, this is a system of simultaneous equations, each of which are unidentified. Additionally, the data that we use (discussed below) are purely time series in nature, which makes it difficult to distinguish brand-level pricing 
Ideally, both the AIDS demand equations and the price reaction functions would be estimated together in a large seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, as in CFM, since SUR is asymptotically the most efficient procedure. However, as the number of brands in the analysis increases, the size of the equation system increases exponentially, making it much more costly -in terms of degrees of freedom as well as computing resources -to undertake three-stage least squares estimation. Since we work with 12 brands, the SUR system would involve 256 coefficients in 23 equations, even with all restrictions from demand theory in place. Attempting this is a topic for a future version of the paper 9 .
Another way to improve estimation would be to include additional exogenous, identifying variables in the demand and price reaction models. Currently both (4) and (5) assume, for example, that costs, marketing strategies, demographic patterns, preferences, and the number of competing products are constant over the period of estimation. Variables that could be added include: (a) advertising 9 Note that CFM worked with far fewer brands, such that they never had more than 8 equations in the SUR system. expenditures / marketing campaigns, (b) the price of raw cereal ingredients (although these are only a fraction of selling price), (c) the price of paper used in cereal boxes (another small fraction of selling price), and (d) the total number of cereals available in the segment.
Once we have the estimated set of demand and price reaction elasticities, we: (a) have the unilateral elasticity ( 11 η ) that a brand manager theoretically perceives if acting alone, (b) can calculate the observed elasticity actually perceived by brand managers using the formula . SAMI observations are at the brand-level, are in dollars and pounds for the U.S. market as a whole, and correspond to four-week intervals, such that there are 13 observations per year. The average price for a brand is obtained by dividing sales in dollars by sales in pounds. To account for general inflation over time, we deflated the value data using the Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. City Average Food and Beverage Price Index, which is available on their web site. The time series was split into two periods (January 1975 to December 1980 , and January 1982 to November 1990 in order to capture the effects of changes in the regulatory environment (i.e., the termination of the FTC "Big Three" case in early 1981).
For this paper -which is exploratory at this point -we focus on the 'Traditional Kids' cereal market. This segment was chosen because it is well-defined in the sense that it is easier to discern whether a cereal belongs to this group than it is within the other segments identified in Cotterill and Haller (all family/basic, simple health/nutrition, and taste enhanced wholesome). Traditional kids cereals are distinguished by a combination of high sugar content and marketing targeted at kids, in which the image of a colorful cartoon character is typically emphasized as opposed to family imagery, or health/nutritive properties 11 . For example, Quaker Cap N Crunch is unquestionably a kid cereal, while
Frosted Flakes is not necessarily so, since it is popular with adults. The 12 kid cereals included in the study account for an average 79% share 12 of the kid segment in the SAMI data from 1975 to 1990. The SAMI data itself accounts for approximately 95% of cereal sales in the U.S.
IV. Some preliminary results
During estimation of models (4) 12 These particular shares are calculated on the basis of pounds of cereal. Shares in the empirical analysis are on an expenditure basis. 13 We carried out estimation in SHAZAM version 8. To correct for autocorrelation we used non-linear estimation, which enables selection of the 'auto' option (see SHAZAM version 8 manual, p. 148).
Price elasticities of demand
Because of space constraints, it is not possible to report the cross-price elasticities of demand for either of the two time periods. (These are used to calculate the observed and fully collusive price elasticities, which are described below.) In general there is little to report except that, while we might expect all cross-price elasticities to be positive (since brands should be substitutes for each other), there were a substantial number of negative cross-price elasticities. This may have been because we burdened the estimation framework with too many brands (12 in total). Nevo (2000a) states that the multi-stage AIDS framework works well for a small number of brands, but "as the number of brands in each segment increase beyond a handful, this method becomes less feasible" (p. 545). Own-price elasticities, which represent unilateral market power, are discussed below.
Price reaction elasticities
As with the cross-price elasticities, for lack of space it is not possible to display the price-reaction elasticities, which indicate the degree to which one brand's price is changed as the price of another changes. These are generated for the purpose of calculating the observed own-price elasticties, and we describe those below. Table 1 presents the own price elasticities which are later used to calculate indexes concerning the type and degree of market power exhibited by brands. The second and third columns of Table 1 report the fully collusive price elasticities, which are calculated using the formula
Elasticities perceived by brands
. In brief, the fundamental finding was that the fully collusive elasticities on average changed little across the two time periods.
Own-price elasticities reflect market power under purely unilateral behavior, and are reported in columns four and five of Table 1 . Those for 1975 Those for -1980 are reported in column four, and range from -0.89 for Honey Comb to -7.62 for Super Golden Crisp (with the exception of Trix, which is slightly positive). Own-price elasticities for the second period are reported in the fifth column, and range from -3.23 in the case of Apple Jacks to -8.17 in the case of Super Golden Crisp. The key result is that there is notably higher price sensitivity in the second period, which suggests that consumers lost loyalty to particular brands. This may be related to the rapid entry of new cereals between the periods of the study.
Columns six and seven of Table 1 present the own-price elasticities that brand managers actually observed in each time period, calculated with the formula
. Entries in these two columns with an asterisk (*) indicate that collusion was occurring because the demand curve perceived by a brand manager is more inelastic than the demand curve that would have been perceived unilaterally.
Entries with no asterisk indicate that a brand is involved in competitive rivalry. Looking at the period during the FTC case, only 4 brands appear to have behaved collusively. However, after the case was dropped, 6 of the brands exhibited collusive behavior (only two exhibited collusive behavior in both of the periods). Two of the observed own price elasticities were extremely elastic in the first period (including -75.35 for Trix), suggesting that behavior was essentially competitive ( Table 2 ). The few entries that are positive (Honey Comb, Cap N Crunch, Cap N Crunch Berry, and Honey Smacks), are due to exceptionally large price reaction elasticities estimated for some brands.
Indexes of market behavior
Tables 2 through 4 are the results of central interest, and correspond to the indexes of market power described in Section II above. These indexes allow us to determine (i) the degree to which brands exercised market power before and after the termination of the FTC case, (ii) the type of market power that may have been exercised (unilateral versus collusive), and (iii) whether there was change in the above two characteristics once the FTC dropped its case in the early 1981. percent. These results are generally not explained by any change in collusive market power among the brands (Table 1 , columns two and three). Instead, these results are due to the fact that unilateral own price elasticities became much more elastic in the second period of the study (Table 1, columns four and 14 Two cases are outside the unit interval. In the case that the index is greater than 1 (Honey Comb), unilateral market power was effectively stronger than collusive. In the case that the index is negative (Trix), the own price elasticity was positive.
five). One explanation is that new product introduction in the industry during this period led consumers to be more price sensitive. This "flattening" of the demand curve reduced the ability of brands to exercise market power unilaterally. . This indicates the degree of combined unilateral and collusive pricing power possessed by a brand. In each of the two periods, 9 of 12 brands had the ability to exercise coordinated market power (i.e. had nonnegative values). While in the majority of cases this pricing power appears quite moderate, the third column of Table 3 indicates that 8 of 12 brands saw an increase in total market power after the FTC dropped its case. This is the result of central interest in our study. Since Table 1 shows that in most cases brands had less unilateral market power in 1982-1990 than in 1975-1980 (columns four and five), the increase in total power must have been due to a rise in the ability to exercise coordinated market power. Table 4 during 1975-1980 , the CQ was negative, indicating that there was competitive rivalry among the brands. This continued to be a feature during the 1982-1990 period, as 6 of the 12 brands were in a state of competitive rivalry, though to less of a degree than before. The third column indicates that for 8 of 12 brands, the degree of coordinated market power rose after the FTC dropped its case. Two of the four brands that did not experience an increase in collusive market power (Trix and Corn Pops), did experience an increase in unilateral power, however. This explains why the total market power for 8 of the 12 brands was higher in the 1982-1990 period than it was in the 1975-1980 period (Table 3) .
Examination of

V. Summary and preliminary conclusions
The U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry is highly concentrated, engages in extensive advertising, and continually introduces new varieties of cereal. These attributes are consistent with the exercising of either unilateral or cooperative market power, and in the 1970s led the FTC to prosecute the three largest U.S. cereal makers as a "shared monopoly". The "Big Three" case, however, was ended abruptly by Congressional action in 1981. This study examines the degree and type of market power that may have been exercised prior to and following the termination of the case. Our hypothesis is that once the industry no longer found itself under the spotlight of an on-going governmental investigation, conduct became substantially less competitive. Additionally, we hypothesize that the increase in overall market power was driven mainly by a rise in coordinated as opposed to unilateral market power. We investigate these issues with the differentiated-products oligopoly framework of Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996) , and time-series SAMI data on sales of traditional kids cereals for the periods 1975-1980 and 1982-1990. In preliminary results we find that while unilateral market power was exercised before and after termination of the "Big Three" case, it was lower during the latter period, since consumer own-price elasticities became much more elastic. The decline in the power of brands may have been due to the rapid introduction of competing products. With regard to pricing interaction among the 12 kids cereals, the number of brands engaged in competitive rivalry equaled the number of brands engaged in collusion during the FTC case. After termination of the case, however, the competitive rivalries generally weakened, and collusive behavior became more prevalent. Since the overall rise in collusive power outweighed the fall in unilateral power, these initial results ultimately suggest that total market power increased following termination of the FTC case. 1975-1980 1982-1990 1975-1980 1982-1990 1975-1980 1982-1990 Post Fruity Pebbles -0. In theory this index runs from zero (perfect competition) to one (monopoly). In the one case where the index is greater than 1, unilateral market power was stronger than collusive. In the one case where the index is negative, it is because the own-price elasticity is positive (an unexpected result). In theory this index runs from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopolistic behavior). If the index is less than 0, then own price elasticity is positive. If the index is greater than 1, then observed market power is stronger than it is under full collusion (which is theoretically implausible). 
